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Showing posts with label Holocene thermal maximum. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Holocene thermal maximum. Show all posts

Friday, July 4, 2014

Newsweek: The Disaster We’ve Wrought on the World’s Oceans May Be Irrevocable

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by Alex Renton, Newsweek, July 11, 2014

In the great halls of La Boqueria, Barcelona’s central market, tourists, foodies and cooks gather every day to marvel at the fresh food, like pilgrims at the site of a miracle. The chief shrines are the fish counters, where thousands of sea creatures making up dozens of species gleam pink and gray on mounds of ice. But to many ocean scientists this is not a display of the ocean’s bounty but a museum—by the end of this century, many of these animals may be history due to man’s reckless abuse of the planet. As we keep dumping greenhouse gases into the air, the oceans keep sucking them up, making the waters deadly to their inhabitants.
On the Boqueria’s fish stands I count 10 types of bivalves—creatures like clams, oysters and mussels that use calcium carbonate to make their endlessly varied shells. In as little as 20 years they will be very different and, in some parts of the world, entirely gone. Then there are the ranks of huge Asian prawns and tiny shrimps, terra-cotta crabs from Scotland, and lobsters, magnificent admirals in blue fringed with gold. Lucky for them, these creatures make their shells differently (mostly out of a polymer called chitin), so the rapidly acidifying waters of our oceans won’t dissolve them as it will the exteriors of the bivalves. But the acidification—which some scientists believe is the fastest change in the ocean’s chemistry in 300 million years—appears to harm the working of the gills and change the behavior of the crustaceans when they are very young.
On the crushed ice sit a dozen kinds of finned creatures that the Spanish love—monkfish, hake, sardines, tuna. The Spaniards eat more fish than anyone else in Europe. The effect of changing ocean chemistry on fish health, longevity and reproduction is not yet certain. But even now, many species on the Boqueria stalls are also on one or more European “at-risk” lists: under threat because of overfishing or changes in the chain of foods that supply them, or from the bigger threat of the changing ocean biogeochemistry.

The last is the least understood of these phenomena. Along the coasts and out in the deep, huge “dead zones” have been multiplying. They are the emptiest places on the planet, where there’s little oxygen and sometimes no life at all, almost entirely restricted to some unicellular organisms like bacteria. Vast blooms of algae—organisms that thrive in more acid (and less alkaline) seawater and are fed by pollution—have already rendered parts of the Baltic Sea pretty much dead. A third of the marine life in that sea, which once fed all of Northern Europe, is gone and may already be beyond hope of recovery.
“There’s a profound game-changing event going on in the life of the sea,” says Callum Roberts, a professor of marine conservation at the University of York, England. “The fact is that changes in alkalinity are going to cause massive reorganization of marine life, impacts on marine food webs, productivity, all sorts of things. We’re heading for a car crash here.”
Many of these risks are caused by one of the world’s most pressing problems: climate change. Rising greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are causing global temperatures to rise, which is leading to the melting of the polar ice caps, which in turn has resulted in rising sea levels and a host of ecological issues.
It’s also causing the chemical makeup of the world’s oceans to change so rapidly. Carbon dioxide, one of the key perpetrators in the lineup of man-made greenhouse gases, is absorbed by seawater, causing a chemical reaction near the ocean surface that results in lowered pH levels. And about one-third of all the man-made carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere ends up absorbed by the oceans. Carles Pelejero, a scientist working less than a mile from La Boqueria at the Institut de Cienciès del Mar (ICM), on Barcelona’s seafront, calls it “climate change’s evil twin.”
He illustrates the basic mechanism to schoolchildren by getting them to take a straw and blow into a glass of water. A simple litmus test shows the children how the pH level drops as the carbon dioxide from their breath dissolves in the water. It’s a sign that naturally alkaline water is becoming less so—and it’s what is happening on a global scale as the oceans absorb a significant amount of the carbon dioxide we pump out through the burning of carbon fuels. “In preindustrial times the ocean’s pH was 8.2. It has already gone down to 8.1,” says Pelejero. “Depending on what we do, it will reach an average of 7.8 or 7.7 by 2100. It hasn’t been that low for 55 million years.” For reference, the pH scale runs from 0 to 14; the lower the number the more acidic, and the higher the more alkaline.
Pelejero leads part of the ICM’s marine biogeochemistry research, but his field is even more specific: marine paleo-reconstruction. You might call it seabed archaeology; it uses drills to take samples from deep in the sediment at the bottom of the ocean. Scientists can use those samples to work out how the geochemistry of sea creatures has changed over the millennia. Pelejero started in this business in the mid-1990s using the remains of plankton in the sediments on the ocean floor to determine historic sea surface temperatures.
Then, in 1998, while studying a graph at a conference, Joanie Kleypas, an American biologist working on coral reefs, had a eureka moment. When she suddenly realized that the lowered alkalinity at the end of the 21st century would in effect corrode the calcium carbonate foundation of the reefs to destruction, she was so horrified she left the room to be sick. Herpaper on the threat, published in the journal Science in 1999, was an alarm call. Other scientists quickly dubbed the effect “ocean acidification”—although the seas would not actually turn to acid, the phrase, they reckoned, would emphasize the urgency and get action. Coral reefs are necessary to an estimated 25 percent of all marine life, including 4,000 species of fish. They are the rain forests of the sea.
Around the same time, Pelejero’s colleagues turned their core-sampling techniques to work out how the ocean and its animals behaved long ago, when the water pH was lower. What they found was horrifying. During a 100,000-year-long event known as the Palaeo-Eocene Thermal Maximum (PETM), which occurred between the Palaeo and Eocene epochs, 55 million years ago, “you see that the sediment is quite white from the fossil shells—then suddenly it turns red,” Pelejero says. “Because there are no shells at all. Then it turns white again—but the change back took more than 100,000 years.” The first change from white to red represents a sudden die-off of shell-based life; the turn back to white shows the gradual return of shellfish over time. If projections hold, the pH change that killed off or radically altered many of the deep ocean shell animals will arrive again at the end of this century.
Other problems are likely to emerge because of the pH change. One of the suggestions is that the stable, solid form of methane—called clathrates—that lurks in the ocean sediment may be upset by changes in water chemistry and temperature, and release the gas into the atmosphere. Methane is a greenhouse gas many times more damaging than carbon dioxide, which has, in the past, turbocharged global warming. This is called the “clathrate gun hypothesis,” and the core samples suggest that this is just what might have happened during the PETM, when large numbers of ocean species (particularly from the deeps of the seas) disappeared and the ocean surface was 9 to 16 degrees Fahrenheit warmer. That doesn’t sound like much. But it’s enough to radically alter life underwater—and to wreak havoc on land dwellers, too. Many of the world’s major cities would disappear beneath the rising waves as the ice melts and the water expands. During the PETM, sea levels were as much as 350 feet higher than they are today—enough to obliterate most of present-day Europe, the northeast coast of the U.S. and Argentina, for example.
What worries Pelejero most is the rapidity of today’s changes. The same shifts that happened over the course of a few thousand years during the PETM are now due to happen over just a few centuries, counting from the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and the widespread use of fossil fuels. “The record tells us that, though pH has been lower in the past, this time the changes are happening about 10 times faster. And that means there is no time for species to evolve and adapt, or the ocean to buffer itself,” Pelejero says. “It’s clear that the ocean is acidifying, much clearer than that the world is warming. And we know that most of the effect is caused by man’s actions. The only argument among scientists is over how much damage is being done.”
Already some effects are being seen. Across the world, shells of some animals are thinner than they were 300 years ago. An acidification spike around the coast of British Columbia in February 2014 wiped out 10 million scallops. Foraminifera, the tiniest shelled plankton in the ocean, are having trouble growing (as they did during the PETM)—and plankton is the food base of every animal in the sea. Coccolithophores, the shelled plankton that process sunlight like a plant, and whose remains built the White Cliffs of Dover, seem to suffer from current changes in ocean chemistry.
Pteropods, tiny swimming snails, are the main diet of cold-water fish most commonly consumed in both Europe and North America—salmon, haddock, cod and pollack. In the lab, pteropods dissolve in lowered alkali waters, like a tooth in Coca-Cola. In the Arctic, where acidification is progressing fastest, pteropods may already be on the way out. It is as though the Earth were losing its grass, and the cows had nothing to eat.
Rising Tides Kill All
A day after visiting the fish markets, I lounged on the deck of a tiny former fishing boat off the northern Catalan coast, as oceanologists threw up into the lurching waves around us. We were off to take ICM’s monthly water samples.
The boat is skippered by a remarkable man, 63-year-old Josep Pascual, a legend around the fishing ports of the Costa Brava. As a boy, he went out in this boat with his father and grandfather to net fish for the market. “I used to listen to them, talking as fishermen do about the weather and the sea temperature, and I got interested.”
He decided to add some hard data to the family debate. So since the mid-1960s he has been building his own instruments, and taking a daily record of sea temperatures at different depths in the Mediterranean current off the fishing port of Estartit, Spain. In that little harbor there’s a box containing an ingenious gadget attached to the seawall that measures the height of the sea. “I built it from parts that were thrown out of the old meteorological station,” Pascual says. “I’d read in a book that there were no tides in the Mediterranean—I wanted to prove that was wrong.” He succeeded, and he has also shown that the average sea level in the Mediterranean has risen about 3.5 inches over the past 24 years. That is in line with the global calculations of melting ice cover made by climate change scientists. The rising sea levels, of course, are caused by greenhouse gases in the atmosphere—which are also what’s causing acidification.
Pascual’s work came to the attention of the ICM in the early 1970s. Ever since then, ICM and Pascual have worked together. The fishing nets and lines on the Fiera del Mar are now replaced by global positioning systems, depth-measuring tools and complex thermometer instruments. They have done this long enough to prove significant warming of the Costa Brava sea.
Seven years ago, sponsored chiefly by the Catalan and Spanish governments, Pascual, Pelejero and their assistants started making monthly trips to measure the ocean’s acidity. These have yet to produce conclusive results—there hasn’t yet been enough time to confirm the clear drop in pH that has been observed out in the open oceans.
Pascual is a smiling, sea-worn man, his nut-brown face in sharp contrast to the biochemists’ laboratory pallor. I ask what he really thinks is going on. “What I’m shocked by most is the rising sea level—and I am convinced this is caused by climate change, and that it is mankind that has done it,” he says. “It’s worrying, because the oceans are so important in capturing the carbon. They thermo-regulate the planet. These changes in their systems are very big, and they should make us worry.”
Into the Dead Zone
Off the desert coast of Oman last winter, I saw the strangest thing I’d ever seen in a lifetime of sea voyaging. Heading in a rigid inflatable boat toward a snorkeling site, my family and I all gasped suddenly as the creamy-white of the wake turned a virulent, toxic-looking green. It had an ammoniac stink, and it stayed that way for the next mile.
“No farming nearby? River estuaries?” asked Esther Garcés, a marine biologist at ICM, when I told her this story. None. The Omani coast I saw was mountain and desert. “Probably a normal, seasonal phytoplankton bloom.”
She showed me spectacular pictures, taken from a European Space Agency satellite, of a green-blue swirl occupying most of the Bay of Biscay, between western France and northern Spain. Garcés’s specialty is harmful blooms of algae and plankton: She makes weekly risk assessments for the whole of the Catalan coast. The chief issue is their potential harm to shellfish farms—when the bivalves eat the algae, the former can become toxic to humans who consume them later. (Less pressing is the fact that they make the tourist beaches look as if they are covered in green slime.)
All such blooms are on the increase, mostly due to pollution from humans on land. Sewage, extra carbon in the atmosphere and the runoff of artificial fertilizers all feed different plankton forms, making the blooms fantastically big. Human tampering with the shape of the coast can create vast areas away from the waves where the algae can peacefully breed.
The 21st century’s algae can have adverse effects far beyond weird-colored water and a smell. The key problems come when plankton die. “The toxins released kill fish and other marine life,” says Garcés, “and then there’s the problem of hypoxia and dead zones.” As the algae blooms die out, the matter that drops from the blooms to the bottom of the ocean eats oxygen as it decomposes (with the help of the bacteria that feed on the dead plankton), and hypoxic (low oxygen) and anoxic (total depletion of oxygen) zones kill everything that needs oxygen to live.
Dead zones move and fluctuate, so they are hard to measure. Oceanographers believe they have increased exponentially since the 1960s, and now count over 400 across the globe. One of the world’s largest is off the Mississippi Delta, caused by algae blooms fed mainly by excess chemical fertilizers spread over the land through which the Mississippi flows. Though it changes from year to year, the Mississippi Delta dead zone has been recorded as large as 8,000 square miles, roughly the size of New Jersey.
Scientists diving in it are quoted by Roberts, in his book Ocean of Life: “As you go deeper, it gets kind of scary. Because there’s nothing there. There’s no fish, no organisms alive, so it’s just us.”
The Mississippi Delta zone is the world’s second biggest coastal hypoxic area, after the Black Sea. But out in the open oceans, hundreds of feet below the surface, there are dead zones so huge they may be bigger than the Sahara Desert—the largest lifeless spaces this side of the moon.
There are three different forces that create zones where there's so little oxygen that most life forms disappear. “Upwellings” in parts of the ocean are natural, caused by ocean currents or undersea seismic activity. Periodically they bring nutrients and phytoplankton (a group of plankton that use sunlight for energy) to the surface. In sunlight this mass feeds on algae blooms, until it dies and the bacteria thrive in their turn, eating the dead plankton and absorbing more oxygen. The Black Sea is stagnant and dead from about 500 feet below its warm surface because of its natural geological structure, and the fact that there are few currents to mix up the oxygen-rich surface with the dark, highly acidic waters below. But a crucial sea for human food, the Baltic, has died because of the mess humans make.
Algae blooms have been a feature of the Baltic since the 19th century, initially because nutrient-filled soil ran off as the native forest was cut down to fuel the industries and build the cities of Northern Europe. Then more plankton food was added by the runoff of pollution from the busy Baltic coastline (which includes major cities like St. Petersburg, Russia; Copenhagen, Denmark; Stockholm; Riga, Latvia; and Helsinki) as well as slurry from the industrialized pig farms that are a major business in parts of Germany and Denmark. Now much of the seabed is covered in life-choking seaweed (a multicellular type of algae), and fish eggs from species like cod cannot survive in the low-oxygen environment.
“The Nordic people have made a huge effort to control the runoff of nutrients into the Baltic,” says Garcés. “But it is too late. The nutrients don’t go away. Every time the organisms grow they die and go back to the bottom again, eating more oxygen. Biodiversity is like a dictionary, and this process in the ecosystem is like losing words. We cannot get them back.”
No Fish for You
The one thing that the Boqueria fishmongers doesn’t sell is jellyfish (there’s not much demand for them in Spain, or anywhere else in Europe), though you can find them, dried to a plastic scab, in some Chinese supermarkets. There are those who say that jellyfish and plankton are all that your average wild seafood eater will have for supper by the end of the century—the very rich will likely still be able to pay up for ultra-rare food items. That’s because as the food chain’s intricate links collapse, the complex species will go first, leaving only the most simple. “The oceans [will] revert to the earliest days of multicellular life,” Roberts drily puts it. There’s a terrifying argument that jellyfish—who rather enjoy acidification—are already taking over the seas, if not the world.
The answers are not easy. Some of the clever “geoengineering” suggestions offered to tackle global warming—like artificially cutting off sunlight—won’t work for the oceans, because we can’t just incrementally slow down the acidification — we have to remove the excess carbon dioxide that’s already out there in the atmosphere. Doing that takes economically painful initiatives—replanting vast areas of forest to recapture carbon, for example, and, above all, simply stopping the burning of fossil fuels.
There are some causes for hope. Some world leaders are beginning to take these threats more seriously. In June, for example, the Obama administration announced a series of measures aimed to conserve the ocean as a key food supply for more than 3 billion of us. These included more ocean sanctuaries to curtail overfishing, and new funds to research ocean biochemistry, including acidification.
Roberts, for his part, says that he has been happy to see that coral reefs have proved more adaptable—faster and faster at recovering from the effects of acid and ozone layer depletion—than scientists previously thought. Recent research suggests than in the more acidic waters predicted for the late 21st century, the reefs may survive a little better than Kleypas and her colleagues originally expected.
“That’s got to be cause for hope,” says Roberts. “But these are isolated instances—they say life is possible in these altered environments, they don’t say that means species will thrive in 2100. Evidence from around the world is that they will not. We have the loss of one of the world’s major habitats on the cards. It’s already happening.”

Friday, October 25, 2013

"Unprecedented recent summer warmth in Arctic Canada," GRL (2013); doi: 10.1002/2013GL057188

Geophysical Research Letters, (2013); doi: 10.1002/2013GL057188

Unprecedented recent summer warmth in Arctic Canada

Gifford H. Miller*, Scott J. Lehman, Kurt A. Refsnider, John R. Southon and Yafang Zhong

Abstract

Arctic air temperatures have increased in recent decades, along with documented reductions in sea ice, glacier size, and snowcover. However, the extent to which recent Arctic warming has been anomalous with respect to long-term natural climate variability remains uncertain. Here we use 145 radiocarbon dates on rooted tundra plants revealed by receding cold-based ice caps in the Eastern Canadian Arctic to show that 5,000 years of regional summertime cooling has been reversed, with average summer temperatures of the last ~100 years now higher than during any century in more than 44,000 years, including peak warmth of the early Holocene when high latitude summer insolation was 9% greater than present. Reconstructed changes in snow-line elevation suggest that summers cooled ~2.7 °C over the past 5,000 years, approximately twice the response predicted by CMIP5 climate models. Our results indicate that anthropogenic increases in greenhouse gases have led to unprecedented regional warmth.

http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/2013GL057188/abstract

Saturday, September 14, 2013

James Hansen: Tar Sands and Dirty Tricks

by James Hansen, September 13, 2013

The New Yorker just published (16 September issue) an excellent article "The President and the Pipeline" on Tom Steyer and the campaign to stop construction of the Keystone XL pipeline. Unfortunately, advocates for the Canadian government's position ("industry officials") were able to slip in a statement that was not fact checked with me "They note that Hansen's dire warning about Canada's unconventional oil deposits was based on the assumption that every ounce of oil in the sands would be burned.

Only a small fraction of the total estimated reserves is recoverable, and doing so will take decades." First, note that the carbon from fossil fuel burning will stay in the climate system for more than 100,000 years before it is buried on the ocean floor as carbonates. So whether it takes a few decades (or even a few centuries) to extract the fuel is pretty irrelevant -- we would be screwing up the planet for our children, grandchildren and, as Native Americans say, the seventh generation.

Second, what I said is that oil in the total tar sands resource is more than double all oil that has been burned in the history of humankind, i.e., less than half of the tar sands is sufficient to match all oil burned so far. (And note that non-tar sands oil is being burned to extract the tar sands goop and process it to make oil, and forests above the tar sands are being destroyed, making the tar sandsimpact even greater.) If we build big pipeline infrastructure, you can be sure that technology developments will allow more and more to be extracted.

There is another error in the New Yorker article, an explanation of the origin of the name of Bill McKibben's organization 350.org: "The name is a nod to Hansen's calculation that once the level of atmospheric carbon dioxide exceeds three hundred and fifty parts per million, climate change could become uncontainable."

In reality, 350 ppm is the CO2 level that, other things being unchanged, would restore Earth's energy balance.

So 350 ppm is an estimate of the CO2 level needed to stabilize global temperature. 

Temperature is now near the upper end of its range during the Holocene, the interglacial period now more than 10,000 years long, which is the climate that civilization is adapted to. It may be necessary to go somewhat lower than 350 ppm to avoid multi-meter sea level rise, so 350 ppm is only an initial estimate for a long-term target. We will know better by the time we get CO2 turned around heading toward 350 ppm. It's unlikely we will want to go back all the way to pre-industrial 280 ppm, because there are other significant climate forcings. These include human-made change of the planet's surface albedo and natural forcings, which are providing a slight push toward global cooling. 

Yet the New Yorker's "climate change could become uncontainable," unfortunately, is not science fiction. If we are so foolish as to burn all fossil fuels, including all coal and unconventional fuels, that result is nearly certain. Our paper discussing that topic, "Climate sensitivity, sea level and atmospheric carbon dioxide," by Hansen, Sato, Russell and Kharecha, is finally being published next week in the Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc. A PDF of the article will be freely available from my web site (www.columbia.edu/~jeh1) or from the journal's web site.

The attached note ("Europe Standing Tall Against a Rogue State") was written to accompany "Tar Sands Debacle and the Hama-Hama-Hama Oil and Gas Corporation," which I hope to finish soon. I include the note now because the situation in Europe is fluid. The Canadian government (not representative of Canada, as I note) is trying to work a backroom deal to avoid an open vote on unconventional fossil fuels.

Does anybody have a guess as to why the Canadian Prime Minister jumped at the chance to line up Canada in favor of Obama's plan to bomb Syria?

I'm sorry to have been so slow in writing -- I have been snowed under working on several things at the same time, including finding support for a new organization -- but I hope to catch up soon.

http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2013/20130913_TarSands+NewYorker.pdf

Friday, September 6, 2013

Rebuttal to Michael Tobis' unsubstantiated attacks on the work of Shakhova

Why the jury's still out on the risk of Arctic methane catastrophe

Can scientists overcome huge uncertainties to pin down how close, or far, we might be to a tipping point?

arctic iceberg
Arctic iceberg. Photograph: Delphine Star/Getty Images
by Nafeez Ahmed, "Earth Insight," The Guardian, September 5, 2013

 About a week ago, climate scientist Michael Tobis wrote a critique of my 'Seven facts about the Arctic methane time bomb' following a twitter exchange with him and Chris Colose, author of an article at Skeptical Science arguing that the core scenario of a new Nature paper by Gail Whiteman et al. on the economic costs of Arctic climate change is extremely unlikely.

Much of this debate kicked off because the said Nature paper advances a hypothetical scenario for an abrupt Arctic methane release over either a decade or several decades of about 50 gigatonnes (Gt), and argues specifically that such a scenario is "likely." My own attempt to understand the literature convinced me that the scenario should be viewed as a serious possibility.

Tobis on the other hand is the latest amongst several scientists offering scathing criticisms of that scenario, which in his own words is "as close to impossible as anything in earth science; actual geophysics refutes it."

He begins with my first point, 1. The 50 Gigatonne decadal methane pulse scenario was posited by four Arctic specialists, and is considered plausible by Met Office scientists.


Tobis writes that the Review of Geophysics paper I cite says
"Arctic thawing may release in excess of 50 GT of C [Carbon], a very serious matter... But Ahmed refers to the paper in support of a very different assertion, that 50 GT of methane would be released... But the paper to which he points says nothing of the sort. I conclude that he doesn't really know what he is talking about. Specifically he has already shown that he is confused about the distinction between methane releases and CO2 releases."
However, the carbon release scenarios from permafrost explored by the paper include both methane and carbon. 

Here's what the paper says:
"The most important determinant of whether release of frozen carbon happens as CO2 or CH4 [methane] is whether decomposition proceeds aerobically or anaerobically... In anaerobic conditions, a greater proportion of soil organic carbon decomposition is released as CH4, although not all of it necessarily reaches the atmosphere."
Following this paragraph, the paper cites several scenarios for large-scale releases from permafrost carbon, including the 50-100 Gt carbon release I mentioned.

Further down, the paper continues:
"Thawing of the terrestrial permafrost will result in CO2 and CH4 emissions on time scales of a few decades to several centuries."
So Tobis is wrong in assuming that the carbon release scenarios the paper is discussing are only CO2 - that isn't specified, so I'd assumed the paper was open on whether the 50-100 Gt emissions were methane or carbon. 

This was a mistake, however. The paper makes clear that although the scenarios are not clear on the precise quantification of carbon dioxide compared to methane releases from permafrost thawing, methane releases would be only be a small percentage of the overall carbon release scenarios explored. So Tobis is ultimately correct - the paper does not back up the specific scenario endorsed as likely by the Nature paper. I stand corrected on that.

Therefore, the plausibility of the specific 50 Gt scenario rises and falls on the credibility of the four Arctic specialists, including Dr. Natalia Shakhova, who came up with the scenario in the first place. That leaves point 1 only half intact, so we're left with:

1. The 50 Gigatonne decadal methane pulse scenario was posited by four Arctic specialists
Tobis unfortunately addresses this with only an ad hominem attack on the expertise of these Arctic specialists:
"Whether we should be acknowledging the 'Arctic specialists' as actually expert is, frankly, the question at hand."
Tobis goes through my other citations of the literature arguing that I am confusing quantities and making unwarranted extrapolations. However, my citations of this literature is simply to clarify that the literature does not rule out potentially dangerous releases of Arctic methane. Does Tobis manage to refute point 2. Arctic methane hydrates are becoming increasingly unstable in the context of anthropogenic climate change and it's impact on diminishing sea ice? No. Arctic methane hydrates are becoming increasingly unstable. I said nothing more, or less, than exactly that.

What about fact 3. Multiple scientific reviews, including one by over 20 Arctic specialists, confirm decadal catastrophic Arctic methane release is plausible?

Tobis concedes "A couple of reviews do give some support to this, but are vague about time scales." He then links to what he describes as a "DOE report." Instead, the link goes through to a Geophysical Research Letters study, which, however, he completely ignores, instead quoting from the original Review of Geophysics paper as follows: 

"The risk of a rapid increase in [methane] emissions is real but remains largely unquantified..." 

And he calls me confused! 

He then argues that there is "plenty of room for acceleration without hitting the cataclysmic level. Further evidence doesn't support the immediacy of that scenario at all."

But the Review of Geophysics paper does NOT say that there is "plenty of room for acceleration without hitting the cataclysmic level" - it says that:
"... significant increases in methane emissions are likely, and catastrophic emissions cannot be ruled out."
The paper does NOT say available evidence "doesn't support the immediacy" of a catastrophic scenario, but rather that "uncertainties are large, and it is difficult to be conclusive about the time scales and magnitudes of methane feedbacks."

As for the Geophysical Research Letters study Tobis links to but ignores, it says:
"... while many deep hydrate deposits are indeed stable under the influence of rapid seafloor temperature variations, shallow deposits, such as those found in arctic regions or in the Gulf of Mexico, can undergo rapid dissociation and produce significant carbon fluxes over a period of decades."
I think my fundamental contention - that the scientific literature recognises the possibility of some sort of catastrophic methane scenario - remains valid. Tobis is right, however, to emphasise that there is very little evidence available on quantifying that possibility.

In response to fact 4. Current methane levels are unprecedented, Tobis says yes, but they are "not climbing rapidly", and therefore this is mere "hype." My intention here was not to suggest that current Arctic methane levels are definitive evidence of a catastrophe already underway, but simply to note that it is wrong to say methane levels are NOT rising. They are, and once again, Arctic specialists are concerned. 

According to Charles Miller of NASA's new research programme, Carbon in Arctic Reservoirs Vulnerability Experiment (CARVE):
"The CARVE science team is busy analyzing data from its first full year of science flights. What they're finding, Miller said, is both amazing and potentially troubling.
'Some of the methane and carbon dioxide concentrations we've measured have been large, and we're seeing very different patterns from what models suggest," Miller said. "We saw large, regional-scale episodic bursts of higher-than-normal carbon dioxide and methane in interior Alaska and across the North Slope during the spring thaw, and they lasted until after the fall refreeze. To cite another example, in July 2012 we saw methane levels over swamps in the Innoko Wilderness that were 650 parts per billion higher than normal background levels. That's similar to what you might find in a large city.'
"Ultimately, the scientists hope their observations will indicate whether an irreversible permafrost tipping point may be near at hand. While scientists don't yet believe the Arctic has reached that tipping point, no one knows for sure. 'We hope CARVE may be able to find that "smoking gun," if one exists,' Miller said."
So while NASA Arctic specialists say Arctic methane levels are "amazing" and "potentially troubling," outside the range of most model predictions, and possibly indicative that "an irreversible permafrost tipping point" is near - a matter which "no one knows for sure" - Tobis wants to interpret all the evidence as "refuting" any need for concern. 

The other problem is that Arctic monitoring is still poor, and might be missing significant methane emissions. As Shakhova and her co-author Igor Semiletov told the New York Times' Andy Revkin:
"It is no surprise to us that others monitoring global methane have not found a signal from the Siberian Arctic or increase in global emissions... The number of stations monitoring atmospheric methane concentrations worldwide is very few. In the Arctic there are only three such stations - Barrow, Alert, Zeppelin - and all are far away from the Siberian Arctic. We are doing our multi-year observations, including year-round monitoring, in proximity to the source. In addition to measuring the amount of methane emitted from the area, we are trying to find out whether there is anything specific about those emissions that could distinguish them from other sources. It is incorrect to say that anyone is able to trace that signal yet."
Most Arctic specialists recognise that there's simply not enough research to justify dismissing the possibility of a catastrophe. That sword cuts both ways, of course - equally, there's not enough research justifying conclusions that we are definitely on the brink of a catastrophe.

On 5. The tipping point for continuous Siberian permafrost thaw could be as low as 1.5 C, Tobis concedes this "is on the table," but that "it has nothing to do with undersea methane." Um, I never said it had anything to do with undersea methane.

On 6. Arctic conditions during the Eemian interglacial lasting from 130,000 to 115,000 years ago are a terrible analogy for today's Arctic, he writes: "as a response to Chris Colose" this is a "terrible" response, "because Colose is not relying on the Eemian but on the early Holocene as the analogous period." Yes, Colose does refer to the early Holocene, but he also repeatedly refers to the Eemian, the "Last Interglacial period between 130,000 to 120,000 years ago." In a previous article, I'd already mentioned that in the early Holocene, the East Siberia Arctic Shelf (ESAS) was "not an underwater shelf but a frozen landmass" as reason to be sceptical that paleoclimate data provide a ready analogue for the present.

Tobis then launches an ad hominem attack on climate scientist Paul Beckwith, whom I quoted for this article, and whom Tobis refers to as:
"'Prof' Paul Beckwith, the 'Professor Beckwith' who is a grad student at Ottawa U."
For the record, earlier this year, Beckwith formally passed his PhD examination on abrupt Arctic climate change at the Laboratory for Paleoclimatology and Climatology, University of Ottawa, where he is currently a part-time professor in climatology. Rather than addressing Prof Beckwith's argument, Tobis wants to demean his reputation and ignore his argument (which he fails to refute). Beckwith's full response to Colose is here. Among Beckwith's points, he argues that neither the early Holocene nor Eemian offer good analogues for the present Arctic:
"Earth tilt was larger, so Winter Northern Hemispheric solar radiation was about 40 W/m2 lower than today at 60 degrees North. Thus, the ice formed much more quickly and much thicker in the winter back then. Also, at night much more heat was radiated out to space in the lower GHG world then as compared to our 400 ppm levels today... the summertime Arctic is not believed to be seasonally ice free during these periods. The last time this happened was likely 2 or 3 million years ago... Colder winters in the early Holocene and Last Interglacial and much colder nights (in summers and winters then) meant much thicker and extensive ice formation in winters, and slower melting at night, respectively."
If I was to take Tobis' approach, I could have noted that Chris Colose is a "grad student" at the University of Albany. I didn't, because it's irrelevant.

Finally, Tobis takes on fact 7. Paleoclimate records will not necessarily capture a large, abrupt methane pulse with the following obfuscation: "Now, we swing back to saying that it HAS occurred in the recent geological past, indeed at the time which Colose says is the better analogy." 

This is incorrect. Here, I merely point to a paper in Science by Nisbet which argues specifically that the cold Younger Dryas was ended due to methane emissions which came mostly from wetlands, but for which the initial trigger could have been Arctic methane clathrates:

"A possible explanation for the sudden end of the Younger Dryas is that, at a time of high Arctic insolation, an initial outburst of methane - perhaps from a geological source such as methane clathrates - triggered global warming, initiating both strong wetland emission in the tropics and north (8), and further hydrate responses as the thermal shock penetrated the permafrost (9, 10), freeing methane from decomposing clathrate hydrates and releasing gas pools trapped beneath them."
The evidence for this, however, is inconclusive, so the paper concludes: "The jury thus remains out on the initial trigger..."

On the issue of whether paleoclimate records will actually capture a large, abrupt methane pulse such as the scenario proposed by Shakhova et al., as this paper in Earth and Planetary Science Letters observes, "rapid methane perturbations in the atmosphere are strongly smoothed in ice core records" due to "the relatively short atmospheric lifetime of methane." So it is quite possible that an abrupt, catastrophic methane release of the sort Shakhova proposes has happened, but is undetected in ice cores.

Tobis then declares a "scientific consensus has been reached" that Shakhova's scenario is "implausible in the extreme."

But the scientific consensus amongst ESAS experts is quite different, as I'd already noted. A peer-reviewed study by 20 Arctic specialists of ESAS data from 1995-2011, drawing of course also on Shakhova's work, specifically recognises:
"The emission of methane in several areas of the [ESAS] is massive to the extent that growth in the methane concentrations in the atmosphere to values capable of causing a considerable and even catastrophic warning on the Earth is possible."
It seems clear to me that the scientific literature on the danger of an Arctic methane catastrophe recognises the possibility unequivocally, but highlights huge uncertainty in our knowledge of the processes at work. Most of the literature I've been able to find on this subject shows great humility - and while acknowledging the possibility of worst-case scenarios, makes quite clear that the likelihood of those scenarios is very difficult to gauge.

The Nature paper by Whiteman et al. went too far in stating the Shakhova et al. scenario as "likely." But on the other end of the spectrum, in the comments to his own blog, Tobis hints that Shakhova et al. are involved in "junk science" - despite the fact that their papers have been published in peer-reviewed journals (their 50 Gt scenario is discussed in this paper originally published in the Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences), and that their general thesis is taken seriously by the US National Science Foundation.

Tobis also refers to a response to the Whiteman paper submitted to Nature (though not yet published) by Nisbet et al., which argues that Shakhova's scenario is "improbably large" as there is no evidence for such events during past "glacial/postglacial transitions."

This is certainly a notable contribution to the debate, but if past paleoclimate conditions are not a good analogue for present Arctic conditions - a matter which remains a matter of scientific debate - and if ice cores would not record such a rapid scenario, then the central argument of this paper may be questionable.

Indeed, a 2007 Royal Society paper by NASA scientist Drew Shindell backs this up:
"... the rarity of palaeoclimate evidence for hydrate-induced climate changes argues that this is a fairly unlikely candidate for near-term sudden climate change. Unlike the others, however, anthropogenic climate change may alter the probability of hydrate release when compared with the past, making the overall probability of near-term release extremely difficult to estimate...
Massive methane release by hydrates or from peats also seems to have been extremely rare in the past, but could become more probable in the future world under the influence of anthropogenic forcing. However, at present, it is not possible to judge the probability for such changes reliably."
Shindell's argument offers a warning that lack of past evidence is not a reason for present complacency where anthropogenic forces are changing the climate in ways not necessarily captured by paleoclimate evidence. 

So where does this leave us with regard to the risk of abrupt, catastrophic methane releases? As far as I can discern, the literature is largely agnostic about it, emphasises that specific scenarios are difficult to quantify, and calls for further research. The Review of Geophysics paper, for instance, far from asserting that a catastrophic methane release is refuted by geophysical evidence - as Tobis says - concludes:

"A significant increase in CH4 emissions and atmospheric concentrations due to climate change is therefore a possible scenario for the next century. However, uncertainties are very large, and as discussed above, it is difficult to be very conclusive regarding the magnitude of CH4 feedbacks and their time scales."
What about Shakhova et al.'s specific scenario of a potential 50 Gt methane release at any time (the basic contours of her argument are outlined here, no paywall)? Shakhova et al. say simply that the scenario should be taken seriously as a possibility underscoring the importance of further ESAS research. The fact that Nature co-author Prof Peter Wadhams, who heads up polar ocean physics at Cambridge, also takes it seriously, is significant. Is Prof Wadhams' expertise also to be attacked? Ultimately, in my view, Tobis fails to show either that this scenario specifically, or abrupt methane catastrophe more generally, are unlikely. 

In particular, his claim that there is a scientific consensus demonstrating near impossibility of a risk of a catastrophic methane event strikes me as unsupportable. Disagreement among scientists over the Arctic methane question is real, and it seems clear that Arctic specialists - Shakhova included - largely agree that while catastrophe is possible, more research is needed to discern how likely or unlikely it might be.

While other scientists, many reputable, argue importantly that such scenarios are beyond the pale, to my mind Tobis' egregious ad hominems against Arctic scientists whom he disagrees with have no place in scientific debate.

Dr Nafeez Ahmed is executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development and author of A User's Guide to the Crisis of Civilisation: And How to Save It among other books. Follow him on Twitter @nafeezahmed

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/sep/05/jury-out-arctic-methane-catastrophe-risk-real

In response to a comment, Dr. Ahmad wrote:

The simple purpose of my articles on the Arctic methane question have been to investigate whether the scientific literature bears out the possibility of a catastrophe. Apart from the fact this issue is obviously of interest to anyone, my own particular interest in the issue is related to how such an event would impact our societies, economies and geopolitics. 

Of course, I'm not an expert on this issue. Anyone can see that from my bio. Should that prevent me from trying to understand and engage with it?

It's mistaken to think that I am disrespecting the scientist bloggers who think Shakhova's scenario specifically and an abrupt methane catastrophe scenario generally have negligible probability. While these scientist bloggers have articulated their views very well, the reality is that there are lots of other scientists - their views being expressed in the literature - who argue that we cannot rule out such scenarios, and that we cannot even know for sure how likely or unlikely they are.

Now Semiletov and Shakova are clearly at the forefront of research on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf (ESAS), and are the main people arguing that the ESAS harbours a unique danger of abrupt climate change due to conditions not found anywhere else on the planet. 20 Arctic specialists agree with them.

Perhaps they are wrong, and the scientist bloggers critiquing them are right. But I don't know that, and looking at the peer-reviewed literature, I cannot see any arguments which support the idea that Shakhova is talking complete nonsense. Yes, there have been several of blog posts by scientists and science students suggesting this - but all the peer-reviewed analyses of the question of Arctic methane risks by leading scientists in the field show that there is a possible danger here which cannot be quantified.

Now Tobis is openly arguing, effectively, that Shakhova and her colleagues are non-experts, and that they offer no evidence for their claims. So who is disrespecting scientists, really? As a mere journo trying to get to the bottom of this, as a mere HUMAN trying to get to the bottom of this, I'm genuinely trying to understand how Tobis and others can insist Shakhova et al. offer ZERO evidence at all. How can they be permitted to deliver papers at scientific conferences, how can they be publishing in peer-reviewed journals (and I note that their 50 Gt abrupt methane release scenario was also peer-reviewed too) if all they are doing is junk science? Shakhova is repeatedly arguing that significant portions of the ESAS is underlain by methane gas hydrates which are relatively shallow and vulnerable to destabilisation, based on direct observation and sampling. Is she lying? Is she deluded? And are the Arctic specialists reviewing her and others' ESAS research who think there is something to their findings also deluded and/or liars?

I just find this really difficult to believe. It doesn't seem credible to me that Shakhova et al. and the Arctic scientists who support them/consider them credible - many of them leading experts in the field too - are just talking nonsense and junk science combined with unwarranted speculation. If that's the case, how the hell are they getting published in leading science journals? And why do so many Arctic specialists agree with them? Prof Peter Wadhams from Cambridge told me that there is a relative consensus on the possibility of danger amongst ESAS experts. Is he just lying too? Or deluded?

If that IS happening, then there is a fundamental problem with the scientific process here, Shakhova et al. need to be put in their place, and we should all be worried about how a large number of Arctic specialists can be taken in by complete speculative nonsense.

From my perspective, I see two sets of experts - most Arctic specialists themselves, who will not rule out the possibility that Shakhova might be right and who respect her work - and a lot of non-Arctic experts who, however, may well have expertise in methane hydrates generally or climate modelling, who find Shakhova's arguments far-fetched and evidence-thin. 

It's in this context of disagreement that I've tried to see what the peer-reviewed literature itself says, and I've tried to let the lit speak for itself as much as is possible here. I don't see any lit which proves any scientific consensus demolishing Shakhova et al. 

Readers are encouraged to do their own research and make up their own minds, and yes of course, to read up on my links (please don't tell me you like reading blogs hoping for gospel truth - the links are there to be read and checked as supporting evidence!) and if you disagree with my conclusions, the key thing that would help me is to see how and why Shakhova et. al are not actually providing compelling evidence for their arguments. 

I won't be able to respond further for a while as I'm away, but will read constructive comments with interest.
 

Monday, February 11, 2013

Warm climate -- cold Arctic? The Eemian is a poor analogue for current climate change

by Phys.Org, June 14, 2012

The Eemian interglacial period that began some 125,000 years ago is often used as a model for contemporary climate change. In the international journal Geophysical Research Letters, scientists from Mainz, Kiel and Potsdam, Germany, now present evidence that the Eemian differed in essential details from modern climatic conditions.

To address the question about how climate may develop in the future, earth scientists direct their attention to the past. They look for epochs with similar conditions to today. The major identified climatic processes are then simulated with numerical models to further test possible reactions of the Earth's system. 


An epoch which is often regarded suitable for such an undertaking is the Eemian warm period, which began around 125,000 years ago following the Saalian ice age. For about 10,000 years, average temperatures on Earth in the Eemian were rather enhanced – probably several degrees above today's level. This seems to be well documented in both ice cores as well as terrestrial records from land vegetation. Substantial parts of the Greenland ice had melted, and global sea level was higher than today. 

"Therefore, the Eemian time is suited apparently so well as a basis for the topical issue of climate change," says Dr Henning Bauch, who works for the Academy of the Sciences and the Literature Mainz (AdW Mainz) at GEOMAR | Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel. 

However, in a study which appears in the recent issue of the international journal Geophysical Research Letters  by Dr Bauch and Dr Evgeniya Kandiano of GEOMAR, as well as Dr Jan Helmke of the Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies in Potsdam, now show that the Eemian warm period differed from the present day situation in one critical aspect – the development in the Arctic Ocean. 

In our current warm period, also called Holocene, oceanic and atmospheric circulation delivers large amounts of heat northward into the high latitudes. The most well known heat conveyor is the Gulf Stream and its northern prolongation called the North Atlantic Drift. The currents provide not only the pleasant temperatures in Northern Europe, they also reach as far as the Arctic. 

Studies in the last years have shown that the oceanic heat transport to the Arctic has even increased, while the summer sea ice cover in the Arctic Ocean seems to be decreasing continuously. It has long been assumed that such conditions also prevailed 125,000 years ago. Accordingly, the Arctic should have been by and large ice-free in the Eemian summers. 

Dr Bauch's group examined sediment cores from the seabed in which information about the climate history of the past 500,000 years is stored. These come from the Atlantic to the west of Ireland and from the central Nordic Seas to the east of the island of Jan Mayen. The sediments contain minute calcite tests of dead microorganisms (foraminifers). 

"The type of species assemblage in the respective layers as well as the isotopic composition of the calcitic tests give us information about temperature and other properties of the water in which they lived at that time," explains Dr Bauch. 

The samples from the Atlantic delivered the higher-than-Holocene temperature signals so typical for the Eemian. 

The tests from the Nordic Seas, however, tell quite another story. "The found foraminifers of Eemian time indicate comparatively cold conditions." 

The isotope investigations of the tests, in combination with previous studies of the group, "indicate major contrasts between the ocean surfaces of these two regions," according to Dr Bauch. 

"Obviously, the warm Atlantic surface current was weaker in the high latitude during the Eemian than today." 

His explanation: "The Saalian glaciation which preceded the Eemian was of much bigger extent in Northern Europe than during the Weichselian, the ice age period before our present warm interval. Therefore, more fresh water from the melting Saalian ice sheets poured into the Nordic Seas, and for a longer period of time. This situation had three consequences: The oceanic circulation in the north was reduced, and winter sea ice was more likely to form because of lower salinity. At the same time, this situation led to a kind of 'overheating' in the North Atlantic due to a continuing transfer of ocean heat from the south." 

On the one hand, the study introduces new views on the Eemian climate. On the other hand, the new results have consequences for climatology in general: "Obviously, some decisive processes in the Eemian ran off differently, like the transfer of ocean warmth towards the Arctic. Models should take this into consideration if they want to forecast the future climate development on the basis of past analogues like the Eemian," says Dr. Bauch. 

Journal reference: Geophysical Research Letters 

Provided by Helmholtz Association of German Research Centres.

http://phys.org/news/2012-06-climate-cold-arctic-eemian.html

Sunday, September 23, 2012

"The Norse in Greenland and late Holocene sea-level change," by N. Mikkelsen, A. Kuijpers & J. Arneborg, Polar Record; doi: 10.1017/S0032247407006948

Polar Record, 44(1) (January 2008) 4550; doi: 10.1017/S0032247407006948 

The Norse in Greenland and late Holocene sea-level change 

Naja Mikkelsen and Antoon Kuijpers (Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Øster Voldgade 10, 1350 Copenhagen, Denmarkand Jette Arneborg (Greenland Research Centre at the National Museum of Denmark, Fredriksholms Kanal 12, 1220 Copenhagen, Denmark)
Abstract

Norse immigrants from Europe settled in southern Greenland in around AD 985 and managed to create a farming community during the Medieval Warm Period. The Norse vanished after approximately 500 years of existence in Greenland leaving no documentary evidence concerning why their culture foundered. The flooding of fertile grassland caused by late Holocene sea-level changes may be one of the factors that affected the Norse community. Holocene sea-level changes in Greenland are closely connected with the isostatic response of the Earth's crust to the behaviour of the Greenlandic ice sheet. An early Holocene regressive phase in south and west Greenland was reversed during the middle Holocene, and evidence is found for transgression and drowning of early-middle Holocene coast lines. This drowning started between 8 and 7 ka BP in southern Greenland and continued during the Norse era to the present. An average late Holocene sea level rise in the order of 2–3 m/1,000 years may be one of the factors that negatively affected the life of the Norse Greenlanders, and combined with other both socio-economic and environmental problems, such as increasing wind and sea ice expansion at the transition to the Little Ice Age, may eventually have led to the end of the Norse culture in Greenland.

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1439260

Saturday, September 15, 2012

"History of sea ice in the Arctic" by Leonid Polyak et al., Quartn. Sci. Rev., 29 (2010) doi:10.1016/j.quascirev.2010.02.010

Quarternary Science Reviews, 29 (2010) 17571778; doi:10.1016/j.quascirev.2010.02.010

History of sea ice in the Arctic


Leonid Polyak*, Richard B. Alley, John T. Andrews, Julie Brigham-Grette, Thomas M. CroninDennis A. Darby, Arthur S. Dyke, Joan J. Fitzpatrick, Svend Funder, Marika HollandAnne E. Jennings, Gifford H. Miller, Matt O’Regan, James Savelle, Mark SerrezeKristen St. John, James W. C. White and Eric Wolff

Abstract


Arctic sea-ice extent and volume are declining rapidly. Several studies project that the Arctic Ocean may  become seasonally ice-free by the year 2040 or even earlier. Putting this into perspective requires information on the history of Arctic sea-ice conditions through the geologic past. This information can be provided by proxy records from the Arctic Ocean floor and from the surrounding coasts. Although existing records are far from complete, they indicate that sea ice became a feature of the Arctic by 47 Ma, following a pronounced decline in atmospheric pCO2 after the Paleocene–Eocene Thermal Optimum, and consistently covered at least part of the Arctic Ocean for no less than the last 13–14 million years. Ice was apparently most wide-spread during the last 2–3 million years, in accordance with Earth’s overall cooler climate. Nevertheless, episodes of considerably reduced sea ice or even seasonally ice-free conditions occurred during warmer  periods linked to orbital variations. The last low-ice event related to orbital forcing (high insolation) was in the early Holocene, after which the northern high latitudes cooled overall, with some superimposed shorter-term (multidecadal to millennial-scale) and lower-magnitude variability. The current reduction in Arctic ice cover started in the late 19th century, consistent with the rapidly warming climate, and became very pronounced over the last three decades. This ice loss appears to be unmatched over at least the last few thousand years and unexplainable by any of the known natural variabilities.

Readers, for a discussion of the proxy records and the limitations of the various sediment cores from the Arctic Ocean and its margins, go to the link below and page 4.