Peter Sinclair: Jason Box, "We're f'd"

by Peter Sinclair, Climate Crocks, September 16, 2014

Above – reposting, first Greenland 2014 piece from last week.

After unpacking a few clean clothes, grabbing long showers, and sharing a few moderate adult beverages, Jason Box and I eased back into the media sphere, after almost 2 weeks on the Greenland sheet. Robin Williams was dead. That hit us both at the same time. I checked email. Jason checked twitter. And took on a startled look.

An unusually blunt statement from usually soft spoken Box had gone viral. [In my experience, when scientists start swearing, they are really feeling the import of what is going on.]

Brian Merchant had a piece on Motherboard, here’s part of it:

This week, scientists made a disturbing discovery in the Arctic Ocean: They saw “vast methane plumes escaping from the seafloor,” as the Stockholm University put it in a release disclosing the observations. The plume of methane—a potent greenhouse gas that traps heat more powerfully than carbon dioxide, the chief driver of climate change—was unsettling to the scientists. 

But it was even more unnerving to Dr. Jason Box, a widely published climatologist who had been following the expedition. As I was digging into the new development, I stumbled upon his tweet, which, coming from a scientist, was downright chilling:

Box, who is currently a professor of glaciology at the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, has been studying the Arctic for decades. His accolade-packed Wikipedia page notes that he’s made some 20 expeditions to the Arctic since 1994, and served as the lead author on the Greenland section of NOAA’s State of the Climate report from 2008-2012. He also runs the Dark Snow project and writes about the latest findings in the field at his blog, Meltfactor. 

In other words, Box knows the Arctic, and he knows climate change—and the methane plumes had him blitzed enough to bring out the F bombs. 

Now, the scientists in the Arctic didn’t fully understand why the plumes were occurring. But they speculated that a warmer “tongue” of ocean current was destabilizing methane hydrates on the Arctic slope. 

I called the scientist at his office in Copenhagen, and he talked frankly and emphatically about the new threat, and about the specter of climate change in general. He also swore like a sailor, which I’ve often wondered how climatologists refrain from doing, given the urgency of the problem—it’s certainly an entirely accurate way to communicate the climate plight. 

Salon had a piece. Jason’s twitter feed had more than tripled. His interview with Bill Maher was online.

Jason’s wife called. A Hungarian acquaintance had told her that Jason was front page news in Budapest.

Now Slate has a big one. Excerpt here:

The ice in Greenland this year isn’t just a little dark—it’s record-setting dark. Box says he’s never seen anything like it. I spoke to Box by phone earlier this month, just days after he returned from his summer field research campaign. 

 “I was just stunned, really,” Box told me. 

The photos he took this summer in Greenland are frightening. But their implications are even more so. Just like black cars are hotter to the touch than white ones on sunny summer days, dark ice melts much more quickly. 

As a member of the Geological Survey of Denmark and Greenland, Box travels to Greenland from his home in Copenhagen to track down the source of the soot that’s speeding up the glaciers’ disappearance. He aptly calls his crowdfunded scientific survey Dark Snow. 

There are several potential explanations for what’s going on here. The most likely is that some combination of increasingly infrequent summer snowstorms, wind-blown dust, microbial activity, and forest fire soot led to this year’s exceptionally dark ice. A more ominous possibility is that what we’re seeing is the start of a cascading feedback loop tied to global warming. Box mentions this summer’s mysterious Siberian holes and offshore methane bubbles as evidence that the Arctic can quickly change in unpredictable ways. 

This year, Greenland’s ice sheet was the darkest Box (or anyone else) has ever measured. Box gives the stunning stats: “In 2014 the ice sheet is precisely 5.6 percent darker, producing an additional absorption of energy equivalent with roughly twice the US annual electricity consumption.” 

Perhaps coincidentally, 2014 will also be the year with the highest number of forest fires ever measured in Arctic.

http://climatecrocks.com/2014/09/16/slate-why-greenlands-dark-snow-should-worry-you/ 

Climate Code Red: Dangerous climate change: Myths and reality. Part 2

by David Spratt, Climate Code Red, August 23, 2014

Download report (16 pages)

Myth 3: Big tipping points are unlikely before 2°C

Tipping points, often an expression of non-linear events, are difficult to project. But if it is sometimes hard to see tipping points coming, it is also too late to be wise after the fact. Estimated tipping points around or below ~1.5 ºC include: 

• West Antarctic Ice Sheet: Current conditions affecting the West Antarctic Ice Sheet are sufficient to drive between 1.2 and 4 metres of sea rise, and these glaciers are now in "unstoppable" meltdown at global average warming of just 0.8 ºC (NASA, 2014A; Rignot, Mouginot et al., 2014; Joughin, Smith et al., 2014). 

• Loss of summer Arctic sea-ice: Because climate models generally have been poor at dealing with Arctic sea-ice retreat (see summary of literature at Spratt, 2013), expert elicitations play a key role in considering whether the Arctic has passed a very significant and “dangerous” tipping point, including Steffen (quoted by Cubby, 2012), Livinia and Lenton (2013), UWA (2012), Serreze (quoted by Romm, 2012), Wadhams (2012; quoted by Vidal, 2012), Maslowski, Kinney et al. (2012) and Laxton (quoted by McKie, 2012). Duarte, Lenton et al. (2012) find that: “Warming of the Arctic region is proceeding at three times the global average, and a new ‘Arctic rapid change’ climate pattern has been observed in the past decade.” Reductions in the sea-ice cover are believed to be the largest contributor toward Arctic amplification. Maslowski, Kinney et al. (2012) note that: “a warming Arctic climate appears to affect the rate of melt of the Greenland ice sheet, Northern Hemisphere permafrost sea-level rise, and global climate change.” It is worth noting that one month of sea-ice-free summer conditions in the Arctic each year would add approx. 0.2 °C to global warming (Hudson, 2011), an event that though credible in the next few decades is not taken into account in any carbon budget modelling. 
• Greenland Ice Sheet (GIS): Current-generation climate models are not yet all that helpful on GIS. They have a poor understanding of the processes involved, and acceleration, retreat and thinning of outlet glaciers are not represented (Maslowski, Kinney et al., 2012). Estimated tipping point for GIS is +1.6 ºC with an uncertainty range of +0.8 to +3.2 ºC (Robinson, Calov et al., 2012). A recent study finds that deep canyons will contribute to more rapid GIS deglaciation (NASA, 2014B; Morlighem, Rignot et al., 2014). Contrary to previous studies, that estimated it would take centuries to millennia for new climates to increase the temperature deep within ice sheets such as GIS, the influence of melt water means warming can occur within decades and produce rapid accelerations (Phillips, Rajaram et al., 2013; University of Colorado Boulder, 2013). As well, "rapid iceberg discharge is possible in regions where highly crevassed glaciers are grounded deep beneath sea level, indicating portions of Greenland and Antarctica that may be vulnerable to rapid ice loss through catastrophic disintegration” (Basis and Jacobs 2013). Informally, many leading cryosphere scientists say the GIS has passed its tipping point, "is already lost" and similar sentiments (pers. com.). With Arctic amplification of around three times average global warming, it is hard to conceive that GIS deglaciation will other than continue to accelerate as reflectivity declines, and late-summer ocean conditions become ice-free. In 2012, then NASA climate science chief James Hansen told Bloomberg that: “Our greatest concern is that loss of Arctic sea ice creates a grave threat of passing two other tipping points – the potential instability of the Greenland ice sheet and methane hydrates… These latter two tipping points would have consequences that are practically irreversible on time scales of relevance to humanity” (Morales, 2012).  
• Coral reefs: “Preserving more than 10% of coral reefs worldwide would require limiting warming to below +1.5 °C (atmosphere–ocean general circulation models (AOGCMs) range: 1.3–1.8 °C) relative to pre-industrial levels” (Frieler, Meinshausen et al., 2013). At 10%, the reefs would be remnant, and the ecosystems as we know them today would be a historical footnote. Data suggests the area of reef systems has already been reduced by half around the world.  
• Permafrost:  In February 2013, scientists using radiometric dating techniques on Russian cave formations to measure melting rates warned that a 1.5 ºC global rise in temperature compared to pre-industrial was enough to start a general permafrost melt. Vaks, Gutareva et al. (2013) found that “global climates only slightly warmer than today are sufficient to thaw extensive regions of permafrost.” Vaks says that “1.5 ºC appears to be something of a tipping point.” In May 2013, Brigham-Grette, Melles et al., (2013) published evidence from Lake El’gygytgyn, in northeast Arctic Russia, showing that 3.6–3.4 million years ago, summer mid-Pliocene temperatures locally were ~8 °C warmer than today, when CO2 was ~400 ppm (a similar level to today). This is highly significant because researchers say the tipping point for large-scale permafrost carbon loss is around +8–10ºC regional temperature increase (Bitz, Ridley et al, 2009). As well, research from Ballantyne, Axford et al. (2013) finds that during the Pliocene epoch, when CO2 levels were ~400 ppm, Arctic surface temperatures were 15–20 °C warmer than today’s surface temperatures. Soon to be published work by Shakhova and Semiletov, as a follow-up to their 2013 paper on shallow-water, sea-floor sediment cores on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf, finds the ocean floor permafrost layer at "thaw point" temperature and "slushy" (pers. com.), suggesting vulnerability of the underlying methane hydrate stability zone, in the area where vast new methane plumes in the ocean are being observed in the 2014 northern summer (Papadopoulou, 2014). 

Figure 2. 2 °C of warming is not a safe target. The temperature reconstruction of Shakun, Clark et al. (2012) and Marcott, Shakun et al. (2013) is combined with the instrumental period data from HadCRUT4 and model average of IPCC projections for the A1B scenario up to 2100.

In summary, there is a very high risk that further significant tipping points will be passed before warming reaches 2 °C. Some of these are irreversible on time scales of centuries to a millenia.

Myth 4: We should mitigate for 2 °C but plan to adapt to 4 °C

The failure of international climate negotiations and insufficient national efforts have led many negotiators and commentators to conclude that warming will not be held to 2 ºC and much higher warming is likely. This has resulted in a policy approach of still trying to reduce emissions (mitigate) for 2 ºC, whilst also planning to adapt to 4 ºC of warming.

World Bank (2012) and Price Waterhouse Coopers (2012) reports complement a range of research that suggests the world is presently heading for 4 ºC or more of warming this century. Global average warming of 4 ºC means around 6 °C of warming over land, and perhaps 7–8 °C at the extremes. IEA Chief Economist Fatih Birol says that emission trends are “perfectly in line with a temperature increase of 6 °C, which would have devastating consequences for the planet” (Rose, 2012).

The notion that we can reasonably adapt to 4 °C is ill-founded because:

• Climate researcher Rachel Warren says, “In… a 4 °C world, the limits for human adaptation are likely to be exceeded in many parts of the world, while the limits for adaptation for natural systems would largely be exceeded throughout the world. Hence, the ecosystem services upon which human livelihoods depend would not be preserved. Even though some studies have suggested that adaptation in some areas might still be feasible for human systems, such assessments have generally not taken into account lost ecosystem services” (Warren, 2010).
• Professor Neil Adger says, "Thinking through the implications of 4 °C of warming shows that the impacts are so significant that the only real adaptation strategy is to avoid that at all cost because of the pain and suffering that is going to cost... There is no science on how we are going to adapt to 4 °C warming. It is actually pretty alarming" (Randerson, 2008).
• At 4 °C hotter, the world would be warmer than during any part of the period in which modern humans evolved, and the rate of climate change would be faster than any previously experienced by humans. The world's sixth mass extinction would be in full swing. In the oceans, acidification would have rendered many calcium-shelled organisms such as coral and many at the base of the ocean food chain artifacts of history. Ocean ecosystems and food chains would collapse (literature surveyed by Spratt, 2011). 
• Warming of 4 ºC is sufficient to melt the polar ice sheets and produce 70 metres of sea-level rise over a longer period of time (Hansen, Sato et al., 2013).
• Prof. Kevin Anderson (2011) says there is a widespread view amongst scientists that “a 4 °C future is incompatible with an organised global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation,’ is devastating to the majority of ecosystems and has a high probability of not being stable.”

One question remains: if the world has practically speaking given up on holding to 2 °C and it is not possible for human civilization to survive in a 4 °C warmer world, what’s the plan? Some have suggested that in fact we have a substantial “carbon budget” available for the 2 °C target…

Myth 5: We have a substantial carbon budget left for 2 °C

The carbon budget has come to public prominence in recent years, including in the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report in 2013, as being the difference between the total allowable greenhouse gas emissions for 2 °C of warming, and the amount already emitted or spent. 
        But this is not as simple as it seems, because 2 °C means different things to different people:

• The 2 °C cap: A cap is an upper boundary, not to be exceeded. This is implicit in international agreements such as the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements which aim to “hold the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C, and to take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity” and the position of the European Commission in 2007, to “ensure that global average temperatures do not exceed preindustrial levels by more than 2 °C” and to “adopt the necessary domestic measures… to ensure” this is the case (emphasis added). This language implies a very low probability of exceeding the target. This is consistent with the approach taken in catastrophic risk management, where the risk of failure must be very small (Dunlop, 2011). Climate change with its non-linear events, tipping points and irreversible events – such as mass extinctions, destruction of ecosystems, the loss of large ice sheets and the triggering of large-scale releases of greenhouse gases from carbon stores such as permafrost and methane clathrates – contains many possibilities for catastrophic failure.
• The 2 °C target: A target can be overshot; in common parlance, we may “miss the target.” This is the language employed for the carbon budget, where misses are part of the target calculations. The IPCC gives carbon budgets only for 33%, 50% and 66% chances of keeping to 2 °C (IPCC, 2013).  Higher probabilities of achieving the target were not reported. The most stringent — at 66% — has a one-in-three chance of exceeding the target, and a range of outcomes from 1 °C to 3.1 °C (with 95% confidence).

Figure 3. The carbon budget and probability of success. The budget (vertical axis) is related to risk of failure (overshooting 
the 2 °C) (horizontal axis) along the blue curve.  Emissions to date are indicated by grey box, leaving the available budget as 
the distance between the blue curve and grey box. As chance of not exceeding the target increases from 33% (green) to 50% (orange) to 66% (red), the budget decreases. At 90% chance of not exceeding the target (black), no carbon budget remains.

 With this distinction between “cap” and “target” in mind:

• For the 2 °C cap, and a risk-averse (low probability of less than 10%) approach of not exceeding the target, there is no carbon budget left for the 2 °C target: "…the combination of a 2 °C warming target with high probability of success is now unreachable" using the current suite of policy measures, because the budget has expired (Raupach, Harman et al., 2011; Raupach, 2013). See Figure 3. "[T]o provide a 93% mid-value probability of not exceeding 2 °C, the concentration would need to be stabilized at, or below, 350 ppmv CO2e, i.e., below current levels" (Anderson and Bows, 2008). If some reasonably optimistic assumptions are made about deforestation and food-related emissions (halving per unit of production) for the rest of the century, then most emission reduction scenarios are incompatible with holding warming to 2 °C, even with a high 50% probability of exceeding the target, and there is no budget left for fossil fuel emissions  (Anderson and Bows, 2008).
• If we make some optimistic assumptions about how soon emissions peak and decline in the developing world (non-Annex 1 nations), there is no carbon budget available for developed nations (Annex 1 countries) (Anderson and Bows, 2011).
• Accounting for the possible release of methane from melting permafrost and ocean sediment implies a substantially lower budget, but this was not done (IPCC, 2013).

The idea of a carbon budget and “allowable” emissions is dangerous, according to climate scientist Ken Caldeira:

There are no such things as an 'allowable carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions.' There are only 'damaging CO2 emissions' or 'dangerous CO2 emissions.' Every CO2 emission causes additional damage and creates additional risk. Causing additional damage and creating additional risk with our CO2 emissions should not be allowed. If you look at how our politicians operate, if you tell them you have a budget of XYZ, they will spend XYZ. Politicians will reason: 'If we’re not over budget, what’s to stop us to spending? Let the guys down the road deal with it when the budget has been exceeded.' The CO2 emissions budget framing is a recipe for delaying concrete action now (Caldeira, quoted by Romm, 2013B).

Finally, we need to remember that the current level of greenhouse gases is already enough for more than 2 °C of warming, though some gases such as methane are relatively short-lived in the atmosphere. Ramanthan and Feng (2008) calculated that the observed increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) since the pre-industrial era has most likely committed the world to a warming of 2.4 °C (within a range of +1.4 °C to +4.3 °C) above the pre-industrial surface temperatures.

Note: References available at PDF download

• Download full report as PDF

http://www.climatecodered.org/2014/08/dangerous-climate-change-myths-and_23.html

Jason Box: Is the climate dragon awakening? [METHANE!]

by Dr. Jason Box, Meltfactor, July 27, 2014

Using a vast and credible set of climate measurements and physics, James Hansen’s Storms of My Grandchildren makes the case that humans overloading the atmosphere with carbon would eventually trigger the release of vast additional carbon stores locked in shallow sea gas hydrates and from Arctic tundra.

In my professional opinion as a climatologist with more than 70 externally reviewed scientific publications, after 12 years of university education focused on atmospheric and oceanic science, and followed by 10 years of university lecturing on micro and mesoscale meteorology theory and instrumentation, Hansen’s warnings should be met with an aggressive atmospheric decarbonization program.  We have been too long on a trajectory pointed at an unmanageable climate calamity; runaway climate heating. If we don’t get atmospheric carbon down and cool the Arctic, the climate physics and recent observations tell me we will probably trigger the release of these vast carbon stores, dooming our kids’ to a hothouse Earth. That’s a tough statement to read when your worry budget is already full as most of ours is.

…

December 2013, I found myself in a packed room at the world’s largest science meeting, the AGU fall meeting. The session: “Cutting-Edge Challenges in Climate.” Invited speaker Dr. Lori Bruhwiler presented ”Arctic Permafrost and Carbon Climate Feedbacks” -- a cautious, objective, and science-only [politics-free] survey of the Arctic carbon issue and what data we have. Also invited, Dr. Peter Wadhams pitched, ”The cost to society of a methane outbreak from the East Siberian shelf,” off the fence, citing costs to humanity measured in trillions of $. My take-home from the session was well paraphrased by Bruhwiler, citing a sparse observational network, concluding “we just can’t say much yet.”  That was then…

The global network of greenhouse gas sampling stations as per NOAA.

Clearly, considering the vastness of the Arctic, the network of ground-based observing stations does appear sparse, with a solitary station representing Siberia, at Tiksi, you’re left thinking that governments should do more to keep their finger on this pulse. On the pulse side, however, the measurements happening at Tiksi (and other sites in the network such as Alert and Pt. Barrow northern Alaska), I can tell you, are really high end, with BSRN radiometers, eddy covariance gas fluxes, gas flask sampling, etc., impressive and not inexpensive. What do these data tell us?

1. A 30-year methane data series from Alert, far northern Canada, includes an 8% increase in methane. This is the most recent 8% of the more than 250% humans have elevated methane since industrialism began year 1750 or so. The Tiksi record begun recently is too short to deduce a trend. But it includes, like the other records in this network, spikes.
2. Methane records from this network include occasional spikes. Green symbols on the charts below indicate these extreme positive outliers. A reasonable hypothesis for the outliers marked below by me with dragon breath (I had these labeled WTF?) would be: extreme outlying positive anomalies represent high methane concentration plumes emanating from tundra and/or oceanic sources. Another reasonable hypothesis would be: extreme outlying positive anomalies represent observational errors. What NOAA states:  the outliers “are thought to be not indicative of background conditions, and represent poorly mixed air masses influenced by local or regional anthropogenic sources or strong local biospheric sources or sinks.” Fair enough. But, the dragon breath hypothesis has me losing sleep.

Same spikes evident in 32 years of Pt. Barrow, Alaska data. here, I don’t bother to overlay the dragon breaths.

While we don’t have permanent measurements floating over the oceanic centers of action, for example over the Eastern Siberian shallow continental shelf, we do have satellite data from the Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer (IASI) on board the Eumetsat Polar System (EPS) Metop-A Satellite. And as I know from installing/maintaining Arctic ground measurements and publishing articles assessing the quality of satellite-derived retrievals from the Arctic, most recently here, validation studies are needed. So, it’s good to find Xiong et al. (2013) who, using “596 methane vertical profiles from aircraft measurements by the HIAPER Pole-to-Pole Observations (HIPPO) program” find that the remotely sensed quantities are accurate and have a small (less than 2%) low bias. Yet, their assessment is for the part of the atmosphere well above the surface. Some accuracy findings for IASI over the Arctic are provided by the Yurganov et al. (AGU poster 2012) that concludes:

• 
  
• 
  
• 
  
• 
  
• IASI data can be used as qualitative indicator of the Arctic Ocean methane emission.
• Current methane growth in the Arctic, including 2012, is gradual.
• Methane emission from the Arctic shelf has a maximum in September-October. [when sea ice minimum occurs]
• Top-down emission estimates are difficult and may be very uncertain (e.g., ± 100%)
• If a sudden venting (bubbling) of methane would happen due to intense hydrates destruction, IASI would be able to detect it near real-time 

Now, a Sam Carana leads a group who have been blogging up a storm about methane estimates from the IASI sensor. Their messaging is alarming, connecting dots between methane maps they generate using IASI data and a number of rapidly changing Arctic climate elements: declining sea ice area, duration, volume; increasing air and sea surface temperature; wildfires.

My understanding was that the methane bubbles can’t or don’t make it to the surface, instead are converted to much less potent carbon dioxide before reaching the surface. Then, here’s what we hear from 4 days ago from a Swedish team now surveying the Laptev Sea with a very high-end icebreaker, named for the main Norse god Oden.

The Swedish team states, “At several places, the methane 'bubbles’ even rose to the ocean surface.” That’s damn scary. Atmospheric methane release is a much bigger problem than atmospheric carbon dioxide release, since methane is ~20 times more powerful greenhouse gas. If as it seems, sea ice reduction is destabilizing the shallow Arctic Ocean continental shelf waters. Without the reflective cover, the ocean is taking on a lot more solar heating during the 24-h summer days, making it harder for the sea ice to reform, in a self compounding feedback process. Places like the Laptev and East Siberian Seas, are shallow, and the water column can more easily be mixed by wind action than when sea ice cover was there. This new heating and mixing can be what unlocks the shallow sea gas hydrates, allowing the methane up to the surface.

The methane bubbles they filmed boiling up toward, even to the surface of the Arctic Ocean.

The story of methane bubbles coming to the surface is not actually that new. Here’s a 2011 piece on the topic. Shakova et al. (2013) suggest that: “significant quantities of methane are escaping the East Siberian Shelf as a result of the degradation of submarine permafrost over thousands of years. We suggest that bubbles and storms facilitate the flux of this methane to the overlying ocean and atmosphere, respectively. 

What’s the take home message, if you ask me? Because elevated atmospheric carbon from fossil fuel burning is the trigger mechanism poking the climate dragon. The trajectory we’re on is to awaken a runaway climate heating that will ravage global agricultural systems leading to mass famine, conflict. Sea level rise will be a small problem by comparison. We simply MUST lower atmospheric carbon emissions. This should start with limiting the burning of fossil fuels from conventional sources; chiefly coal, followed by tar sands [block the pipeline]; reduce fossil fuel use elsewhere for example in liquid transportation fuels; engage in a massive reforestation program to have side benefits of sustainable timber, reduced desertification, increase animal habitat, aquaculture; and redirect fossil fuel subsidies to renewable energy subsidies. This is an all hands on deck moment. We’re in the age of consequences.

There are still questions, of course, but the precautionary principle makes clear we have to keep this dragon in the ground.

http://www.meltfactor.org/blog/?p=1329

Shakhova: methane in atmosphere is increasing 3x faster than carbon dioxide

Living on Earth, December 12, 2013

The sea surface above the East Siberian continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean is made up of broken ice and methane bubbling to the surface. Credit: Courtesy of Igor Semiletov, University of Alaska Fairbanks.

There are millions of tons of the powerful greenhouse gas methane trapped underwater in the continental shelf of the Arctic Ocean.

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This methane had been held in place for thousands of years by a cap of frozen soil on the seabed. But now research at the University of Alaska in Fairbanks has found this methane is escaping into the atmosphere at faster and faster rates, adding to global warming in a feedback loop that accelerates the warming.

The study concentrated on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf. Natalia Shakhova, lead author on the study, says this particular area makes up about 25% of the Arctic shelf.

"Because the permafrost was thought to be stable and reliably preventing this methane escaping from the seabed deposits, this area has never been considered a source of methane to the atmosphere, never until very recently when we started investigating this area 10 years ago," she says.

Roughly 17 million tons of methane are released into the environment annually from this shelf.

"Arctic tundra is thought to be the major source of methane, natural methane, in the northern hemisphere, so it’s kind of comparable to terrestrial sources," Shakhova says. "For hundreds of thousands of years ... the permafrost on top of the sediment has been serving as a cap, as a seal, preventing the escape."

As the permafrost thaws, a phenomenon happening on land and under the sea, it becomes less efficient at containing greenhouse gases, like methane. And methane is a particularly nasty greenhouse gas, with one ton of methane packing the climate changing potential of at least 20 tons of carbon dioxide, Shakhova adds. 

"The concentration of methane in the atmosphere is increasing much faster than that of carbon dioxide," she says. "The last 200 years, the concentration of methane in the atmosphere increased about three times."

Methane has a relatively short lifespan, 10 to 30 years, but it is converted to carbon dioxide — so still dangerous to the atmosphere. 

One of the biggest concerns is this Arctic methane will create a dangerous loop, with the methane raising the temperatures, melting more of the permafrost and releasing more methane.

But, it's still possible this situation could be stemmed, or at least slowed.

"We better believe in science and in ourselves because I’m sure that we will be able to come up with ideas how to solve this problem, how to fix it, how to mitigate, how to maybe recover this methane," Shakhova says.

http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-12-12/thawing-ocean-floor-pours-methane-atmosphere-and-its-only-getting-worse

Shakhova & Semiletov: East Siberian Arctic Shelf is venting at least 17 teragrams of the methane, double previous estimates, now on par with terrestrial permafrost release

Methane burns as it escapes through a hole in the ice in a lagoon above the East Siberian Arctic Shelf. (Credit: Photo courtesy of Natalia Shakhova)

Check it out at methanetracker.org !!!

Nov. 25, 2013 — The seafloor off the coast of Northern Siberia is releasing more than twice the amount of methane as previously estimated, according to new research results published in the Nov. 24, 2013, edition of the journal Nature Geoscience.

The East Siberian Arctic Shelf is venting at least 17 teragrams of the methane into the atmosphere each year. A teragram is equal to 1 million tons.

"It is now on par with the methane being released from the Arctic tundra, which is considered to be one of the major sources of methane in the Northern Hemisphere," said Natalia Shakhova, one of the paper's lead authors and a scientist at the University of Alaska Fairbanks. "Increased methane releases in this area are a possible new climate-change-driven factor that will strengthen over time."

Methane is a greenhouse gas more than 30 times more potent than carbon dioxide. On land, methane is released when previously frozen organic material decomposes. In the seabed, methane can be stored as a pre-formed gas or asmethane hydrates. As long as the subsea permafrost remains frozen, it forms a cap, effectively trapping the methane beneath. However, as the permafrost thaws, it develops holes, which allow the methane to escape. These releases can be larger and more abrupt than those that result from decomposition.

The findings are the latest in an ongoing international research project led by Shakhova and Igor Semiletov, both researchers at the UAF International Arctic Research Center. Their twice-yearly Arctic expeditions have revealed that the subsea permafrost in the area has thawed much more extensively than previously thought, in part due to warming water near the bottom of the ocean. The warming has created conditions that allow the subsea methane to escape in much greater amounts than their earlier models estimated. Frequent storms in the area hasten its release into the atmosphere, much in the same way stirring a soda releases the carbonation more quickly.

"Results of this study represent a big step forward toward improving our understanding of methane emissions from the East Siberian Arctic Shelf," said Shakhova. She noted that while the ESAS is unusual in its expansive and shallow nature, the team's findings there speak to the need for further exploration of the subsea Arctic. "I believe that all other Arctic shelf areas are significantly underestimated and should be paid very careful attention to." [Quite true, lots coming from shelves around Greenland.]

The East Siberian Arctic Shelf is a methane-rich area that encompasses more than 2 million square kilometers of seafloor in the Arctic Ocean. It is more than three times as large as the nearby Siberian wetlands, which have been considered the primary Northern Hemisphere source of atmospheric methane. Previous estimates performed for the ESAS suggested that the area was releasing 8 teragrams of methane into the atmosphere yearly.

During field expeditions, the research team used a variety of techniques -- including sonar and visual images of methane bubbles in the water, air and water sampling, seafloor drilling and temperature readings -- to determine the conditions of the water and permafrost, as well as the amount of methane being released.

Methane is an important factor in global climate change, because it so effectively traps heat. As conditions warm, global research has indicated that more methane is released, which then stands to further warm the planet. Scientists call this phenomenon a positive feedback loop.

"We believe that the release of methane from the Arctic, and in particular this part of the Arctic, could impact the entire globe," Shakhova said. "We are trying to understand the actual contribution of the ESAS to the global methane budget and how that will change over time."

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/11/131125172113.htm

Rebuttal to Michael Tobis' unsubstantiated attacks on the work of Shakhova

Why the jury's still out on the risk of Arctic methane catastrophe

Can scientists overcome huge uncertainties to pin down how close, or far, we might be to a tipping point?

Arctic iceberg. Photograph: Delphine Star/Getty Images

by Nafeez Ahmed, "Earth Insight," The Guardian, September 5, 2013

 About a week ago, climate scientist Michael Tobis wrote a critique of my 'Seven facts about the Arctic methane time bomb' following a twitter exchange with him and Chris Colose, author of an article at Skeptical Science arguing that the core scenario of a new Nature paper by Gail Whiteman et al. on the economic costs of Arctic climate change is extremely unlikely.

Much of this debate kicked off because the said Nature paper advances a hypothetical scenario for an abrupt Arctic methane release over either a decade or several decades of about 50 gigatonnes (Gt), and argues specifically that such a scenario is "likely." My own attempt to understand the literature convinced me that the scenario should be viewed as a serious possibility.

Tobis on the other hand is the latest amongst several scientists offering scathing criticisms of that scenario, which in his own words is "as close to impossible as anything in earth science; actual geophysics refutes it."

He begins with my first point, 1. The 50 Gigatonne decadal methane pulse scenario was posited by four Arctic specialists, and is considered plausible by Met Office scientists.

Tobis writes that the Review of Geophysics paper I cite says

"Arctic thawing may release in excess of 50 GT of C [Carbon], a very serious matter... But Ahmed refers to the paper in support of a very different assertion, that 50 GT of methane would be released... But the paper to which he points says nothing of the sort. I conclude that he doesn't really know what he is talking about. Specifically he has already shown that he is confused about the distinction between methane releases and CO2 releases."

However, the carbon release scenarios from permafrost explored by the paper include both methane and carbon. 

Here's what the paper says:

"The most important determinant of whether release of frozen carbon happens as CO2 or CH4 [methane] is whether decomposition proceeds aerobically or anaerobically... In anaerobic conditions, a greater proportion of soil organic carbon decomposition is released as CH4, although not all of it necessarily reaches the atmosphere."

Following this paragraph, the paper cites several scenarios for large-scale releases from permafrost carbon, including the 50-100 Gt carbon release I mentioned.

Further down, the paper continues:

"Thawing of the terrestrial permafrost will result in CO2 and CH4 emissions on time scales of a few decades to several centuries."

So Tobis is wrong in assuming that the carbon release scenarios the paper is discussing are only CO2 - that isn't specified, so I'd assumed the paper was open on whether the 50-100 Gt emissions were methane or carbon. 

This was a mistake, however. The paper makes clear that although the scenarios are not clear on the precise quantification of carbon dioxide compared to methane releases from permafrost thawing, methane releases would be only be a small percentage of the overall carbon release scenarios explored. So Tobis is ultimately correct - the paper does not back up the specific scenario endorsed as likely by the Nature paper. I stand corrected on that.

Therefore, the plausibility of the specific 50 Gt scenario rises and falls on the credibility of the four Arctic specialists, including Dr. Natalia Shakhova, who came up with the scenario in the first place. That leaves point 1 only half intact, so we're left with:

1. The 50 Gigatonne decadal methane pulse scenario was posited by four Arctic specialists
Tobis unfortunately addresses this with only an ad hominem attack on the expertise of these Arctic specialists:

"Whether we should be acknowledging the 'Arctic specialists' as actually expert is, frankly, the question at hand."

Tobis goes through my other citations of the literature arguing that I am confusing quantities and making unwarranted extrapolations. However, my citations of this literature is simply to clarify that the literature does not rule out potentially dangerous releases of Arctic methane. Does Tobis manage to refute point 2. Arctic methane hydrates are becoming increasingly unstable in the context of anthropogenic climate change and it's impact on diminishing sea ice? No. Arctic methane hydrates are becoming increasingly unstable. I said nothing more, or less, than exactly that.

What about fact 3. Multiple scientific reviews, including one by over 20 Arctic specialists, confirm decadal catastrophic Arctic methane release is plausible?

Tobis concedes "A couple of reviews do give some support to this, but are vague about time scales." He then links to what he describes as a "DOE report." Instead, the link goes through to a Geophysical Research Letters study, which, however, he completely ignores, instead quoting from the original Review of Geophysics paper as follows: 

"The risk of a rapid increase in [methane] emissions is real but remains largely unquantified..." 

And he calls me confused! 

He then argues that there is "plenty of room for acceleration without hitting the cataclysmic level. Further evidence doesn't support the immediacy of that scenario at all."

But the Review of Geophysics paper does NOT say that there is "plenty of room for acceleration without hitting the cataclysmic level" - it says that:

"... significant increases in methane emissions are likely, and catastrophic emissions cannot be ruled out."

The paper does NOT say available evidence "doesn't support the immediacy" of a catastrophic scenario, but rather that "uncertainties are large, and it is difficult to be conclusive about the time scales and magnitudes of methane feedbacks."

As for the Geophysical Research Letters study Tobis links to but ignores, it says:

"... while many deep hydrate deposits are indeed stable under the influence of rapid seafloor temperature variations, shallow deposits, such as those found in arctic regions or in the Gulf of Mexico, can undergo rapid dissociation and produce significant carbon fluxes over a period of decades."

I think my fundamental contention - that the scientific literature recognises the possibility of some sort of catastrophic methane scenario - remains valid. Tobis is right, however, to emphasise that there is very little evidence available on quantifying that possibility.

In response to fact 4. Current methane levels are unprecedented, Tobis says yes, but they are "not climbing rapidly", and therefore this is mere "hype." My intention here was not to suggest that current Arctic methane levels are definitive evidence of a catastrophe already underway, but simply to note that it is wrong to say methane levels are NOT rising. They are, and once again, Arctic specialists are concerned. 

According to Charles Miller of NASA's new research programme, Carbon in Arctic Reservoirs Vulnerability Experiment (CARVE):

"The CARVE science team is busy analyzing data from its first full year of science flights. What they're finding, Miller said, is both amazing and potentially troubling.

'Some of the methane and carbon dioxide concentrations we've measured have been large, and we're seeing very different patterns from what models suggest," Miller said. "We saw large, regional-scale episodic bursts of higher-than-normal carbon dioxide and methane in interior Alaska and across the North Slope during the spring thaw, and they lasted until after the fall refreeze. To cite another example, in July 2012 we saw methane levels over swamps in the Innoko Wilderness that were 650 parts per billion higher than normal background levels. That's similar to what you might find in a large city.'

"Ultimately, the scientists hope their observations will indicate whether an irreversible permafrost tipping point may be near at hand. While scientists don't yet believe the Arctic has reached that tipping point, no one knows for sure. 'We hope CARVE may be able to find that "smoking gun," if one exists,' Miller said."

So while NASA Arctic specialists say Arctic methane levels are "amazing" and "potentially troubling," outside the range of most model predictions, and possibly indicative that "an irreversible permafrost tipping point" is near - a matter which "no one knows for sure" - Tobis wants to interpret all the evidence as "refuting" any need for concern. 

The other problem is that Arctic monitoring is still poor, and might be missing significant methane emissions. As Shakhova and her co-author Igor Semiletov told the New York Times' Andy Revkin:

"It is no surprise to us that others monitoring global methane have not found a signal from the Siberian Arctic or increase in global emissions... The number of stations monitoring atmospheric methane concentrations worldwide is very few. In the Arctic there are only three such stations - Barrow, Alert, Zeppelin - and all are far away from the Siberian Arctic. We are doing our multi-year observations, including year-round monitoring, in proximity to the source. In addition to measuring the amount of methane emitted from the area, we are trying to find out whether there is anything specific about those emissions that could distinguish them from other sources. It is incorrect to say that anyone is able to trace that signal yet."

Most Arctic specialists recognise that there's simply not enough research to justify dismissing the possibility of a catastrophe. That sword cuts both ways, of course - equally, there's not enough research justifying conclusions that we are definitely on the brink of a catastrophe.

On 5. The tipping point for continuous Siberian permafrost thaw could be as low as 1.5 C, Tobis concedes this "is on the table," but that "it has nothing to do with undersea methane." Um, I never said it had anything to do with undersea methane.

On 6. Arctic conditions during the Eemian interglacial lasting from 130,000 to 115,000 years ago are a terrible analogy for today's Arctic, he writes: "as a response to Chris Colose" this is a "terrible" response, "because Colose is not relying on the Eemian but on the early Holocene as the analogous period." Yes, Colose does refer to the early Holocene, but he also repeatedly refers to the Eemian, the "Last Interglacial period between 130,000 to 120,000 years ago." In a previous article, I'd already mentioned that in the early Holocene, the East Siberia Arctic Shelf (ESAS) was "not an underwater shelf but a frozen landmass" as reason to be sceptical that paleoclimate data provide a ready analogue for the present.

Tobis then launches an ad hominem attack on climate scientist Paul Beckwith, whom I quoted for this article, and whom Tobis refers to as:

"'Prof' Paul Beckwith, the 'Professor Beckwith' who is a grad student at Ottawa U."

For the record, earlier this year, Beckwith formally passed his PhD examination on abrupt Arctic climate change at the Laboratory for Paleoclimatology and Climatology, University of Ottawa, where he is currently a part-time professor in climatology. Rather than addressing Prof Beckwith's argument, Tobis wants to demean his reputation and ignore his argument (which he fails to refute). Beckwith's full response to Colose is here. Among Beckwith's points, he argues that neither the early Holocene nor Eemian offer good analogues for the present Arctic:

"Earth tilt was larger, so Winter Northern Hemispheric solar radiation was about 40 W/m2 lower than today at 60 degrees North. Thus, the ice formed much more quickly and much thicker in the winter back then. Also, at night much more heat was radiated out to space in the lower GHG world then as compared to our 400 ppm levels today... the summertime Arctic is not believed to be seasonally ice free during these periods. The last time this happened was likely 2 or 3 million years ago... Colder winters in the early Holocene and Last Interglacial and much colder nights (in summers and winters then) meant much thicker and extensive ice formation in winters, and slower melting at night, respectively."

If I was to take Tobis' approach, I could have noted that Chris Colose is a "grad student" at the University of Albany. I didn't, because it's irrelevant.

Finally, Tobis takes on fact 7. Paleoclimate records will not necessarily capture a large, abrupt methane pulse with the following obfuscation: "Now, we swing back to saying that it HAS occurred in the recent geological past, indeed at the time which Colose says is the better analogy." 

This is incorrect. Here, I merely point to a paper in Science by Nisbet which argues specifically that the cold Younger Dryas was ended due to methane emissions which came mostly from wetlands, but for which the initial trigger could have been Arctic methane clathrates:

"A possible explanation for the sudden end of the Younger Dryas is that, at a time of high Arctic insolation, an initial outburst of methane - perhaps from a geological source such as methane clathrates - triggered global warming, initiating both strong wetland emission in the tropics and north (8), and further hydrate responses as the thermal shock penetrated the permafrost (9, 10), freeing methane from decomposing clathrate hydrates and releasing gas pools trapped beneath them."

The evidence for this, however, is inconclusive, so the paper concludes: "The jury thus remains out on the initial trigger..."

On the issue of whether paleoclimate records will actually capture a large, abrupt methane pulse such as the scenario proposed by Shakhova et al., as this paper in Earth and Planetary Science Letters observes, "rapid methane perturbations in the atmosphere are strongly smoothed in ice core records" due to "the relatively short atmospheric lifetime of methane." So it is quite possible that an abrupt, catastrophic methane release of the sort Shakhova proposes has happened, but is undetected in ice cores.

Tobis then declares a "scientific consensus has been reached" that Shakhova's scenario is "implausible in the extreme."

But the scientific consensus amongst ESAS experts is quite different, as I'd already noted. A peer-reviewed study by 20 Arctic specialists of ESAS data from 1995-2011, drawing of course also on Shakhova's work, specifically recognises:

"The emission of methane in several areas of the [ESAS] is massive to the extent that growth in the methane concentrations in the atmosphere to values capable of causing a considerable and even catastrophic warning on the Earth is possible."

It seems clear to me that the scientific literature on the danger of an Arctic methane catastrophe recognises the possibility unequivocally, but highlights huge uncertainty in our knowledge of the processes at work. Most of the literature I've been able to find on this subject shows great humility - and while acknowledging the possibility of worst-case scenarios, makes quite clear that the likelihood of those scenarios is very difficult to gauge.

The Nature paper by Whiteman et al. went too far in stating the Shakhova et al. scenario as "likely." But on the other end of the spectrum, in the comments to his own blog, Tobis hints that Shakhova et al. are involved in "junk science" - despite the fact that their papers have been published in peer-reviewed journals (their 50 Gt scenario is discussed in this paper originally published in the Proceedings of the Russian Academy of Sciences), and that their general thesis is taken seriously by the US National Science Foundation.

Tobis also refers to a response to the Whiteman paper submitted to Nature (though not yet published) by Nisbet et al., which argues that Shakhova's scenario is "improbably large" as there is no evidence for such events during past "glacial/postglacial transitions."

This is certainly a notable contribution to the debate, but if past paleoclimate conditions are not a good analogue for present Arctic conditions - a matter which remains a matter of scientific debate - and if ice cores would not record such a rapid scenario, then the central argument of this paper may be questionable.

Indeed, a 2007 Royal Society paper by NASA scientist Drew Shindell backs this up:

"... the rarity of palaeoclimate evidence for hydrate-induced climate changes argues that this is a fairly unlikely candidate for near-term sudden climate change. Unlike the others, however, anthropogenic climate change may alter the probability of hydrate release when compared with the past, making the overall probability of near-term release extremely difficult to estimate...
Massive methane release by hydrates or from peats also seems to have been extremely rare in the past, but could become more probable in the future world under the influence of anthropogenic forcing. However, at present, it is not possible to judge the probability for such changes reliably."

Shindell's argument offers a warning that lack of past evidence is not a reason for present complacency where anthropogenic forces are changing the climate in ways not necessarily captured by paleoclimate evidence. 

So where does this leave us with regard to the risk of abrupt, catastrophic methane releases? As far as I can discern, the literature is largely agnostic about it, emphasises that specific scenarios are difficult to quantify, and calls for further research. The Review of Geophysics paper, for instance, far from asserting that a catastrophic methane release is refuted by geophysical evidence - as Tobis says - concludes:

"A significant increase in CH4 emissions and atmospheric concentrations due to climate change is therefore a possible scenario for the next century. However, uncertainties are very large, and as discussed above, it is difficult to be very conclusive regarding the magnitude of CH4 feedbacks and their time scales."

What about Shakhova et al.'s specific scenario of a potential 50 Gt methane release at any time (the basic contours of her argument are outlined here, no paywall)? Shakhova et al. say simply that the scenario should be taken seriously as a possibility underscoring the importance of further ESAS research. The fact that Nature co-author Prof Peter Wadhams, who heads up polar ocean physics at Cambridge, also takes it seriously, is significant. Is Prof Wadhams' expertise also to be attacked? Ultimately, in my view, Tobis fails to show either that this scenario specifically, or abrupt methane catastrophe more generally, are unlikely. 

In particular, his claim that there is a scientific consensus demonstrating near impossibility of a risk of a catastrophic methane event strikes me as unsupportable. Disagreement among scientists over the Arctic methane question is real, and it seems clear that Arctic specialists - Shakhova included - largely agree that while catastrophe is possible, more research is needed to discern how likely or unlikely it might be.

While other scientists, many reputable, argue importantly that such scenarios are beyond the pale, to my mind Tobis' egregious ad hominems against Arctic scientists whom he disagrees with have no place in scientific debate.

Dr Nafeez Ahmed is executive director of the Institute for Policy Research & Development and author of A User's Guide to the Crisis of Civilisation: And How to Save It among other books. Follow him on Twitter @nafeezahmed

http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2013/sep/05/jury-out-arctic-methane-catastrophe-risk-real

In response to a comment, Dr. Ahmad wrote:

The simple purpose of my articles on the Arctic methane question have been to investigate whether the scientific literature bears out the possibility of a catastrophe. Apart from the fact this issue is obviously of interest to anyone, my own particular interest in the issue is related to how such an event would impact our societies, economies and geopolitics. 

Of course, I'm not an expert on this issue. Anyone can see that from my bio. Should that prevent me from trying to understand and engage with it?

It's mistaken to think that I am disrespecting the scientist bloggers who think Shakhova's scenario specifically and an abrupt methane catastrophe scenario generally have negligible probability. While these scientist bloggers have articulated their views very well, the reality is that there are lots of other scientists - their views being expressed in the literature - who argue that we cannot rule out such scenarios, and that we cannot even know for sure how likely or unlikely they are.

Now Semiletov and Shakova are clearly at the forefront of research on the East Siberian Arctic Shelf (ESAS), and are the main people arguing that the ESAS harbours a unique danger of abrupt climate change due to conditions not found anywhere else on the planet. 20 Arctic specialists agree with them.

Perhaps they are wrong, and the scientist bloggers critiquing them are right. But I don't know that, and looking at the peer-reviewed literature, I cannot see any arguments which support the idea that Shakhova is talking complete nonsense. Yes, there have been several of blog posts by scientists and science students suggesting this - but all the peer-reviewed analyses of the question of Arctic methane risks by leading scientists in the field show that there is a possible danger here which cannot be quantified.

Now Tobis is openly arguing, effectively, that Shakhova and her colleagues are non-experts, and that they offer no evidence for their claims. So who is disrespecting scientists, really? As a mere journo trying to get to the bottom of this, as a mere HUMAN trying to get to the bottom of this, I'm genuinely trying to understand how Tobis and others can insist Shakhova et al. offer ZERO evidence at all. How can they be permitted to deliver papers at scientific conferences, how can they be publishing in peer-reviewed journals (and I note that their 50 Gt abrupt methane release scenario was also peer-reviewed too) if all they are doing is junk science? Shakhova is repeatedly arguing that significant portions of the ESAS is underlain by methane gas hydrates which are relatively shallow and vulnerable to destabilisation, based on direct observation and sampling. Is she lying? Is she deluded? And are the Arctic specialists reviewing her and others' ESAS research who think there is something to their findings also deluded and/or liars?

I just find this really difficult to believe. It doesn't seem credible to me that Shakhova et al. and the Arctic scientists who support them/consider them credible - many of them leading experts in the field too - are just talking nonsense and junk science combined with unwarranted speculation. If that's the case, how the hell are they getting published in leading science journals? And why do so many Arctic specialists agree with them? Prof Peter Wadhams from Cambridge told me that there is a relative consensus on the possibility of danger amongst ESAS experts. Is he just lying too? Or deluded?

If that IS happening, then there is a fundamental problem with the scientific process here, Shakhova et al. need to be put in their place, and we should all be worried about how a large number of Arctic specialists can be taken in by complete speculative nonsense.

From my perspective, I see two sets of experts - most Arctic specialists themselves, who will not rule out the possibility that Shakhova might be right and who respect her work - and a lot of non-Arctic experts who, however, may well have expertise in methane hydrates generally or climate modelling, who find Shakhova's arguments far-fetched and evidence-thin. 

It's in this context of disagreement that I've tried to see what the peer-reviewed literature itself says, and I've tried to let the lit speak for itself as much as is possible here. I don't see any lit which proves any scientific consensus demolishing Shakhova et al. 

Readers are encouraged to do their own research and make up their own minds, and yes of course, to read up on my links (please don't tell me you like reading blogs hoping for gospel truth - the links are there to be read and checked as supporting evidence!) and if you disagree with my conclusions, the key thing that would help me is to see how and why Shakhova et. al are not actually providing compelling evidence for their arguments. 

I won't be able to respond further for a while as I'm away, but will read constructive comments with interest.